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Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”: A View 
from American States 
Sanford Levinson 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DISCOVERY OF “DIALOGUE” 
A perennial topic of interest and debate is the role that courts play, as 
a descriptive matter, and ought to play, normatively, within any given 
polity, particularly with regard to enforcement of bills of rights.  At least 
since Alexander Bickel’s influential 1962 book The Least Dangerous 
Branch,1 the legal academy has been “obsessed” with the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” that Bickel posited.2  Like most political 
scientists, I believe the description of courts as countermajoritarian is 
considerably overstated,3 not least because of the impossibility of 
explaining precisely why the dominant political leaders of any polity 
would in fact tolerate genuine countermajoritarian “judicial supremacy” 
over matters deeply important to them.4  It is not surprising, then, that 
                                                     
  W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of 
Texas Law School; Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin.  This 
essay was originally prepared for discussion at a conference on “Judicial Supremacy of Inter-
Institutional Dialogue: Political Responses to Judicial Review,” in Sydney, Australia, May 18, 2010, 
and then a workshop on judicial enforcement of bills of rights at the University of Melbourne on 
May 20.  I am grateful to Jack Balkin, Robert Kagan, Michael Paris, and Dan Rodriguez for several 
very helpful suggestions.  I have also benefitted greatly from the opportunity to present earlier drafts 
to the Boston Area Public Law Study Group and to a faculty colloquium at the Harvard Law School.  
And, of course, I am delighted by the opportunity given me by the editors of the Kansas Law Review 
to come to Lawrence and to participate in this important symposium. 
 1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
 2. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002); see also Barry Friedman, 
The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 933, 933 (2001) (further explaining Friedman’s view that constitutional scholars are obsessed 
with the countermajoritarian problem). 
 3. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to 
Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 380 (2008); Mark A. Graber, The 
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35, 37 
(1993) [hereinafter Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty]. 
 4. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22 (2003).  This book’s importance extends considerably beyond the 
particular East Asian countries on which Ginsburg focuses. 
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much recent writing on the Supreme Court of the United States attacks 
the “countermajoritarian premise” in favor of an analysis that integrates 
the Court (and courts more generally) into the dominant political 
coalitions of an age.5 
As the debate about countermajoritarianism has somewhat waned, 
scholars of the judiciary have focused on the notion of dialogue between 
the judiciary and other institutions that constitute the overall political 
system.6  Of course, the discussion group can be expanded to include the 
citizenry at large.  Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert 
Katzmann, the only member of the federal judiciary to have a Ph.D. in 
political science, has written that “[g]overnance . . . is premised on each 
institution’s respect for and knowledge of the others and on a continuing 
dialogue that produces shared understanding and comity.”7  While 
Professor Barry Friedman has emphasized the notion of dialogue 
throughout his career,8 perhaps the most influential article worldwide has 
been a 1998 essay by Canadian scholars Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell 
about the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9 
In any event, it is important to specify the extent to which the notion 
of inter-institutional dialogue—or, more broadly, dialogue between the 
judiciary and the general public—is truly helpful, either descriptively in 
capturing the actual behavior of relevant institutions, or normatively by 
way of justifying actions of courts that, at least on first appearance, may 
appear to run counter to contemporary majority opinion, whether as 
measured by general public opinion polls or by the views of the 
                                                     
 5. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–
2008, at ix (2009); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: 
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 40–
49 (2007).  It is always possible, of course, that the integration will be imperfect because of lags that 
occur when a new political consciousness triumphs at the polls while members of the judiciary, 
especially those who enjoy life tenure, like U.S. Supreme Court justices, stay on and enforce what 
many believe to be an outmoded constitutional sensibility.  The most famous such occurrence is the 
“Old Court” that systematically tried to eviscerate the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt before 
capitulating to the new understanding.  Id. at 42. 
 6. Justice Kennedy, in his opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, referred to “this ongoing dialogue 
between and among the branches of Government,” 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008), quoted in MARK C. 
MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (2009). 
 7. ROBERT KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997), quoted in MILLER, supra note 6, at 
7–8. 
 8. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580–81 (1993). 
 9. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997).  See also generally Luc B. Tremblay, The 
Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 3 INT’L J. 
CON. L. 617 (2005) (also discussing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
LEVINSON FINAL 5/23/2011  6:44 PM 
2011] COURTS AS PARTICIPANTS IN “DIALOGUE” 793 
ostensible representatives of the public who inhabit elected office.  
Perhaps a better question, especially relevant to dialogical models, is the 
degree to which courts and other more obviously political institutions 
are, in fact, self-conscious partners rather than the adversaries that the 
notion of the “countermajoritarian difficulty” suggests. 
Consider in this context the conclusion of Professor Friedman’s own 
recent book on the American Supreme Court, The Will of the People.10  
What “history teaches,” he writes, is that “[a]lmost everything 
consequential about judicial review occurs after the judges rule, not 
when they do.  Judges do not decide finally on the meaning of the 
Constitution.  Rather, it is through the dialogic process of ‘judicial 
decision—popular response—judicial re-decision’ that the Constitution 
takes on the meaning it has.”11  Friedman writes of the “making and 
enforcing of constitutional meaning” through “an extended dialogue 
between and among the courts and the American people.”12  The 
dialogue that most interests Friedman is not really among institutions, 
but rather between the Court and an almost mythic “We the People.”13  It 
is, we might say, the “extreme case” of the turn toward “dialogical 
models” of judicial decisionmaking, though, obviously, no less 
instructive, because of both its strengths and weaknesses, than more 
modest models that focus more narrowly, say, on interactions among 
necessarily elite decisionmakers ensconced in, say, the Supreme Court, 
the White House, or the Congress.14  It is worth noting that Friedman 
scarcely offers a very precise notion of what he means by “dialogue.” 
There is at least a rhetorical connection between the emphasis on 
dialogue and the embrace by some contemporary political theorists of 
                                                     
 10. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009). 
 11. Id. at 381–82 (emphasis added). 
 12. Id. at 384. 
 13. In this Friedman may remind some readers of Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman, save 
that Ackerman is extraordinarily insistent on demonstrating how public opinion in fact operates 
through the particular institutional structures established by the United States Constitution, 
including, obviously, the presidency and Congress. 
 14. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 7; J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION 
IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2003); see also POWE, 
supra note 5, at ix (describing the Court as less in dialogue with, than the agent of, those elites in 
control of the political system).  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (a 
classic article discussing the dialogue between Court and Congress).  Although this article focuses 
on American courts, it is obvious that similar issues are presented in many other legal systems, 
whether presidential or parliamentary.  Indeed, Hogg and Bushell’s seminal article focused on the 
role of Canadian courts in a decidedly parliamentary system.  See generally Hogg & Bushell, supra 
note 9. 
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“deliberative democracy.”15  A recurrent issue, for example, is what we 
define as a genuinely “deliberative” process.  If one is a Habermasian—
or, for that matter, a devotee of Bruce Ackerman—there will be a great 
emphasis placed on the “undominated” nature of the conversation, so 
that whatever closure is reached is not the product of the greater power 
of one of the ostensible conversant, but rather an agreement produced by 
the power of true reason, as it were.16  One might recall a reference many 
decades ago by another Yale professor, Eugene V. Rostow, to “[t]he 
Supreme Court [as], among other things, an educational body, and the 
Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar.”17  A first-rate 
seminar may indeed feature a great deal of dialogue and changes of mind 
based on the evidence and force of argument, but, with few exceptions, 
there is also no doubt as to who is supreme as between the “teachers” and 
the “students.”  Presumably devotees of dialogical models wish to flatten 
that distinction and to diminish the judiciary’s role as teacher, at least if 
by that metaphor we mean the power to give binding grades.  Moreover, 
one might well wish to distinguish between some kind of genuinely 
public-spirited dialogue, in which all participants are motivated by a 
desire to achieve something that might be captured by the term “general 
welfare,” as against their being motivated by more private interests that 
transform the dialogue into what can more accurately be called a 
“bargaining process.”  To the extent that one speaks, for example, of a 
dialogue between courts and legislatures—or any other bodies, including 
the general public—is one thinking more of an idealized Platonic 
symposium or of an encounter that one might have, say, with a car 
salesman when searching for a new car?  There are, no doubt, significant 
exchanges of information between the buyer and the seller in the latter 
instance, but would we really describe it as a “dialogical encounter” that 
should model our politics? 
Consider in this context Walter F. Murphy’s classic book Elements 
of Judicial Strategy, perhaps the earliest book to elaborate the extent to 
which any savvy judge is intimately aware of the potential responses 
from other actors in the political system, whether colleagues on the 
bench or members of other institutions that are being asked—or, in 
theory, “ordered”—to implement a judicial decision or who might 
                                                     
 15. The literature on deliberative democracy has itself become enormous.  See, e.g., AMY 
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1998); AMY GUTMANN & 
DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004). 
 16. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8–10 (1980). 
 17. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
208 (1952). 
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nonetheless possess certain powers over the court, such as control of 
jurisdiction or salary, that might need to be taken into account when 
deciding how truly “innovative” to be.18  Indeed, graduate students can 
undoubtedly recall seminars in which a great deal of such “strategic” 
encounters took place in an effort to ingratiate oneself with a powerful 
professor.  One presumes that such strategic thinking is not exemplary of 
the kinds of dialogue that proponents of dialogical models have in mind.  
It is not clear to me that legislative responses to judicial review 
necessarily count as dialogue rather than, say, a play in a bargaining 
game by which the respondent legislature makes a counteroffer to the 
court in the hope that the court, recognizing the exigencies of the 
political situation, will accept it and shut down further inquiry. 
The prior paragraph has touched, much too briefly, on some 
conceptual difficulties surrounding the term “dialogue.”  But, of course, 
there are also significant empirical issues involved as well, even if we 
agree on the underlying concept.  Friedman has been rightly criticized for 
his failure to present a robust empirical argument on how exactly this 
“dialogue” takes place between Court and public.19  After all, as Nathan 
Persily writes in his introduction to a recent book, Public Opinion and 
Constitutional Controversy, “[f]or the most part, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and other courts go unnoticed by the American public.”20  
“For the most part,” obviously, does not mean “never,” and one can 
easily cite examples of those relatively few cases that in fact do draw 
public notice.  Even there, however, one can be absolutely confident that 
extremely few members of the public—or, perhaps, anyone else—
actually read the judicial opinions themselves.21  Almost all information 
about the opinions comes to the public as filtered through various media, 
which, in today’s world, can mean practically anything.  As anyone who 
has ever played the telephone game knows, messages can become quite 
transformed from the initial speaker to even the third or fourth one down 
the line, and it may be quite foolhardy to believe that any given speaker 
represents the public.  Friedman often relies, for example, on reporters 
                                                     
 18. See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). 
 19. See, e.g., Justin Driver, Why Law Should Lead, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 2, 2010, at 28–32, 
available at http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/why-law-should-lead (book review 
criticizing “analytical trouble” in Friedman’s The Will of the People). 
 20. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3, 
9 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008). 
 21. One might well wonder how many Americans have actually slogged through the more than 
200 pages of combined opinions in the recent McDonald case that “incorporated” the Second 
Amendment against the states (and city of Chicago).  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010). 
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and pundits from the New York Times for his views on what “the public” 
believes; one need not be a raving populist to doubt that Times 
columnists are mimetic of the general American public.  But even more 
constrained dialogical models, which focus, for example, only on a call 
by the judiciary and a subsequent response by a legislature, may run into 
similar empirical difficulties.  Does anyone believe, for example, that 
members of Congress actually read judicial opinions instead of relying 
on one- or two-page memos from staff (who may, of course, be legally 
trained) that ostensibly capture the gist of far longer opinions (including 
concurrences and dissents)? 
II. WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM PROVIDES A MODEL FOR 
DIALOGUE ABOUT “DIALOGUE” 
My own contribution to this examination of intra-institutional and 
wider public dialogues involves a somewhat unlikely perspective: 
American state constitutions and their interpretation by state supreme 
courts.  Like many students of constitutionalism, I am increasingly 
insistent on a comparative turn and therefore critical of the almost 
exclusive emphasis placed by American “constitutional lawyers” and 
theorists on the United States Constitution.  Much very fine work, of 
course, involves cross-national comparisons.  Although I have indeed 
become more interested in cross-national comparison, I find myself 
increasingly focusing on a rich source of comparative material within the 
United States—state constitutions.  One reason is simply the reality, as 
Robert Williams has written, that “[i]n the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, American state courts emerged as major policy makers, taking 
their place alongside federal courts as important judicial actors in 
governmental lawmaking.”22  That would be enough to justify the turn to 
American state courts and the constitutions they often interpret.23 
But I should confess that one of the agendas of this paper is to attack 
the premise, basically as prevalent in the United States as in the rest of 
the world, that there is a distinctly “American form” of constitutionalism 
that can be found either by close conceptual analysis of the United States 
                                                     
 22. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 283 (2009).  See 
also generally Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State 
Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813 (2011) (reviewing Williams). 
 23. And, incidentally, American state constitutions should also be of great interest to anyone 
concerned with the empirical consequences of different institutional structures, for there are often 
surprising differences in basic political organization between any given state and the United States 
and among states themselves. 
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Constitution—including its historical development over the past 220 
years—or by an exclusive focus on the handiwork of the United States 
Supreme Court.  Friedman’s book is an example of the latter, as is, I 
must admit, Robert McCloskey’s The American Supreme Court, 
originally published in 1960 but published more recently in updated 
editions that I have written.24  One need not renounce such work in order 
to acknowledge, for example, that almost all of the 300+ million 
residents of the United States—save those who reside in the District of 
Columbia—live under two constitutions, one the United States 
Constitution, the other the constitution of the state in which that person 
happens to live.  Indeed, things can become even more complex for 
certain enrolled members of American Indian tribes who may also be 
subject to tribal constitutions.25 
Or consider “cosmopolitans,” rootless or otherwise, who might live, 
in any given year, in more than one state, similar to international 
cosmopolitans with homes or businesses in different countries who may 
be subject to more than one national constitution.  And a full accounting, 
in many parts of the world, might include “transnational” quasi-
constitutions like the European Convention of Human Rights or the 
complex treaty systems enforced by the European Court of Justice, even 
before turning to the ever-uncertain status of “international law.”  Even if 
one believes that there is a strong “hierarchy” among these various legal 
systems so that in case of conflict, one can always predict the winner, 
there is, very often, no such conflict, particularly if the criterion of 
conflict is contradiction.  Often the various constitutions are significantly 
complementary, in which an issue on which the ostensibly superior 
constitution is silent may well be resolved by what, from a conceptual 
standpoint, is a “subordinate” law.  Ranking superior and subordinate 
legal systems raises interesting theoretical problems and is, of course, 
often important to actual litigants.  But we should also recognize the 
frequency with which the issues raised by rank ordering are only 
theoretical—or, one might even say, “academic” in the pejorative sense.  
Most litigants—and many other persons as well—are primarily interested 
in which institution or institutions can act, as a practical matter, with 
final authority, and often these are states or, in those states that grant  
                                                     
 24. See generally ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Native American Constitution and Law Digitization Project, UNIV. OF OKLA. L. 
LIBRARY, http://thorpe.ou.edu/const.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (a compendium of tribal 
constitutions within the United States). 
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“home rule” to municipalities as a matter of state constitutional right, 
even cities.26 
“When Americans speak of ‘constitutional law,’” James Gardner has 
written, “they invariably mean the U.S. Constitution and the substantial 
body of federal judicial decisions construing it.”27  Another notable 
scholar of American state constitutions has described them as “low-
visibility constitutions in the United States,”28 not least because those 
who teach constitutional law in American law schools have a decidedly 
reductive view of their subject.  As former Oregon state justice Hans 
Linde—who is also a distinguished legal academic—wrote, “[g]eneral 
constitutional law courses, which everyone takes, create the impression 
that contemporary majority opinions and dissents in the United States 
Supreme Court exhaust the terms as well as the agenda of constitutional 
litigation.”29  In a recent lecture tellingly titled Why Teach—and Why 
Study—State Constitutional Law, Jeffrey S. Sutton, a member of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit who is also an 
adjunct professor at the Ohio State University, describes state 
constitutional law as “an underdeveloped area of the law,” and he notes 
that of the twenty-four law schools that offered a course in 2007–08 on 
“State Constitutional Law”—as distinguished from state-specific state 
constitutional law courses—not one was rated by U.S. News and World 
Report within the top fifteen law schools in the United States.30 
One might easily explain and perhaps justify this disregard of state 
constitutions if it were the case that the state governments established by 
these constitutions dealt with mere trivialities of no interest to ordinary 
people—or even if they raised no interesting interpretive issues of the 
kind that obsess legal academics.  But neither is remotely true; indeed, 
the premise is laughably—and sometimes tragically—false.  As to the 
first, consider only such obvious issues as land use and taxation, among 
the most predictably volatile of all political issues, and which are present, 
                                                     
 26. See, e.g., Lynn Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial 
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (2009).  See also generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (noting the 
circumstances under which ostensibly subordinate states can affect, and in some circumstances even 
subvert, federal programs that are purportedly binding). 
 27. JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23 (2005). 
 28. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 1. 
 29. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed 
Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 933 (1993). 
 30. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Speech, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 166–67 (2009).  I am grateful to Justin Driver for drawing this article to 
my attention. 
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directly and indirectly, in the financing of public schools.  As Daniel 
Rodriguez asserts, “the basic range of policies and policy choices made 
by state and local officials dwarf—indeed always have dwarfed—
national political activity.”31  Many of these choices, of course, may be 
made “in the shadow” of the national Constitution or of potentially 
preemptive congressional statutes, but some significant number are made 
basically autonomously and, in cases like those considered in this essay, 
in light of state constitutional norms.  One can debate whether the United 
States has a robust federalism, especially if we define that term by 
reference to constitutionally entrenched autonomy of sub-national units 
with regard to issues of significant public importance.32  There can, 
however, be little doubt that as a matter of fact, many issues of great 
public importance are decided within the states and that state 
constitutions are frequently thought to be relevant to such decisions.  
Even if Congress could displace all such decisions through federal 
legislation, we know both that Congress has not done so and is quite 
unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.  And anyone who dips into 
state constitutional cases quickly finds interpretive dilemmas that are no 
less interesting than those generated by the denizens of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Some of the disdain for state level constitutionalism may be 
explained by a somewhat odd debate in the United States about what 
might be termed the ontological status of these state constitutions.33  
                                                     
 31. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Scope of Judicial Review, in NEW 
FRONTIERS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 61, 65 (James A. 
Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2010).  Similarly, a recent editorial in the New York Times by former 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who had been both an elected official and a state judge in Arizona, 
states that “[s]tate courts resolve the most important legal matters in our lives, including child 
custody cases, settlement of estates, business-contract disputes, traffic offenses, drunken-driving 
charges, most criminal offenses and most foreclosures.”  Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the 
Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at WK9.  She presents this in the context of a column 
condemning the way that most states currently elect their judges.  Id.  Obviously, most of the 
examples chosen by former Justice O’Connor rarely involve constitutional issues as such, although 
states often have state-constitutionally-mandated norms of criminal procedure that differ in 
important ways from national norms as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  For example, eleven 
states extend “constitutional protection to privacy, which has been interpreted as affording a broader 
substantive right than the Fourth Amendment’s search-and-seizure clause.”  Helen Herschkoff, State 
Common Law and the Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, in NEW FRONTIERS IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at 151, 158. 
 32. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY 
AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 124–49 (2008) (arguing that American federalism is both very weak and, 
to the extent it exists at all, basically unfortunate—as distinguished from “decentralization,” which is 
a non-constitutionally-demanded political choice with regard to the creation or implementation of 
given public policies). 
 33. Thus, James A. Gardner, one of the leading writers on state constitutions, declared that 
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Some scholars suggest they are not “genuine” constitutions precisely 
because they are all subordinate to the national Constitution and thus do 
not have a seemingly requisite degree of sovereign capacity.34  Others 
note that it is implausible to view state constitutions as instantiating a 
particular people and treat this as a predicate condition for something to 
count as a “real constitution.”35  To be sure, whatever might once have 
been the case, it is difficult to view most, if any—perhaps Texas is the 
exception—of the American states as being a truly distinct community 
from its neighbors.36  Even if, as Justice Antonin Scalia asserts, a 
defining characteristic of the United States Constitution is precisely that 
it speaks in the name of a distinctive “We the American People”37—
which means, among other things, that its interpretation should not 
depend on developments emanating from some other people across the 
seas—it is difficult to make such an argument with regard to state 
constitutions.  After all, not only were many American state constitutions 
borrowed from prototypes adopted by earlier states—from which the 
newcomers might well have left in their treks westward38—but one also 
regularly finds within state court decisions citations to the decisions of 
other state courts as persuasive, even if not binding, authority.  To be 
sure, this can be explained on the basis that state courts are all common 
law courts, as well as interpreters of their state constitutions and statutes 
in a way that federal courts are not.  However, this explanation serves to 
undercut what might be labeled as an “organic nationalist” view of a 
given state. 
Moreover, as already suggested, it is crystal clear, thanks to Article 
VI of the United States Constitution, that no state constitution can 
withstand the force of an otherwise constitutional statute passed by 
Congress or a clause of the United States Constitution that demands 
more protection of a given right than might be accorded by the state 
                                                                                                                       
“state constitutions, to put it bluntly are not ‘constitutions’ as we understand the term.”  James A. 
Gardner, What Is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1026 (1993). 
 34. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
774–75 (1992). 
 35. See id. at 833. 
 36. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 
1, 3 (1989) (“Community functions not as a geographical place, but as a conceptual model of order 
that combines elements of reason and will.”). 
 37. See generally Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: 
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 355 (2004) (discussing Justice Scalia’s reluctance to use 
foreign law and custom in interpreting the Constitution). 
 38. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 86–87 (“state conventions built on the state constitutional 
experience of other states”). 
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constitution.39  There is a rigid hierarchy that clearly places the United 
States Constitution in a position of superiority.  And, at least in theory, 
an Article V amendment rejected by one-fourth of the states—but not the 
vital one-fourth plus one—could radically transform existing state 
polities.  But I’m tempted to ask, so what?  After all, an increasing 
number of national constitutions are part of complex transnational and 
international legal systems that put national law “in its place,” which 
may be subordinate to the transnational norms.  One wonders if these 
analysts will soon be arguing that the constitutions of France and 
Germany, among others, can also be dismissed as lacking “essential” 
attributes of constitutions inasmuch as these countries—like all members 
of the European Union—are increasingly enmeshed in what almost any 
American lawyer or political scientist would describe as a European 
“constitutional order.”  It is also worth noting that Great Britain scarcely 
serves any longer as a knock-down example of a country with no written 
constitution because it has embraced an order that courts enforce with 
increasing vigor. 
Other scholars, in addition to emphasizing the “inferior” place of 
state constitutions in the American constitutional hierarchy, also note that 
few, if any, state constitutions have been treated with the veneration that, 
I believe unjustifiably,40 is directed to the United States Constitution, 
which is treated as the “sacred text” of the American civil religion.41  But 
to demand veneration as a criterion of constitutionalism would call into 
question the status of many, perhaps the overwhelming majority of, 
national constitutions, which, like American state constitutions, are 
treated as objects of instrumental analysis rather than sometimes 
thoughtless devotion.  Even if one can place constitutions along a 
spectrum of their hold over the popular imagination, one should be 
willing to concede that constitutions with relatively limited hold remain 
constitutions until one presents evidence to the contrary, as by 
demonstrating that no one really cares what the constitution says or that 
it is never enforced in any meaningful sense by political authorities.  This 
might well have been the case with the vaunted Soviet constitutions.  But 
even the old joke about the person who goes to the library and asks for a 
copy of the French constitution, only to be told that it is available in the 
periodicals room, takes on new meaning when one realizes that the most 
recent French constitution, establishing the Fifth Republic, has provided 
                                                     
 39. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 40. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 16–19 (2006). 
 41. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 12–13 (1988). 
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a relatively stable structure of governance for a full half-century, and one 
cannot understand the modern French polity without paying at least some 
attention to its constitution.42  It has, after all, lasted almost three times as 
long as the median survival of all national constitutions since 1789, 
which is only nineteen years.43 
There is, therefore, no good reason to ignore the immensely 
interesting data available to anyone who is willing to take a look at the 
fifty state constitutions within the United States.44  Indeed, it may be 
scholarly malpractice to do so.  Even the most cursory examination 
reveals the accuracy of John Dinan’s argument that there is a—or 
perhaps are several—distinctive “American state constitutional 
tradition(s)”45 that challenge much of what is found in the 1787 
Constitution.  To be sure, one might readily point to important 
similarities as well—no American state, for example, has rejected 
separation of powers and a separately elected governor in favor of a 
parliamentary system where the governor would be selected by and 
required to maintain the confidence of a majority of the legislature.46  
Still, with regard especially to the judiciary, the differences between state 
and national constitutions and institutions are striking and worth 
attending to. 
What are some of these differences?  If we begin by looking at the 
organization of the judiciaries themselves, we immediately discover that 
“[a] large majority of state judges face the electorate in either partisan, 
non-partisan, or merit-retention elections.”47  Indeed, a recently 
published article begins by noting that “[a]lmost ninety percent of state 
judges face some kind of popular election.  Thirty-eight states put all of 
                                                     
 42. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241 (1992) (noting that a very large 
amount of legal continuity has been achieved). 
 43. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 129 (2009).  
And, for what it is worth, it has lasted a full seven times longer than America’s “first Constitution,” 
the Articles of Confederation, which were ratified in 1781 and suffered an inglorious demise with 
the ratification of the supplanting Constitution in 1788. 
 44. See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a 
State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1691 (2010) 
(describing how “state constitutional systems borrow from each other”).  I am grateful to Professor 
Devins for giving me the opportunity to read his article before its publication. 
 45. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006) 
(discussing this “tradition”). 
 46. Though, as a matter of fact, Rhode Island adopted a full separation of powers system only in 
2004, following decisions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court holding that Rhode Island did not 
have such a system.  See Carl T. Bogus, The Battle for Separation of Powers in Rhode Island, 56 
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2004). 
 47. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 285. 
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their judges up before the voters.”48  And no American state judge, 
elected or appointed, save in Rhode Island, is entitled to serve for life.49  
In each of the other few states that do not have term limits, there is a 
retirement age of seventy.50  Moreover, even in non-election states, few 
allow their governors to exercise President-like control over the 
appointment process.51  More than thirty states, for example, use 
“commissions” to select candidates whose names are then given to 
governors to choose from.52  As already noted, in forty-seven of the fifty 
states, judges serve restricted “terms” of office—though they are eligible 
to run for re-election or reappointment.  In twelve states, judges are 
subject to being “recalled” by the voters should they issue presumably 
outrageous decisions.53  Although not technically “recalls,” shockwaves 
were certainly felt throughout state judiciaries by the unprecedented 
decision of Iowa voters to reject three justices running in so-called 
“retention elections,” in which voters are asked whether they wish to 
“retain” incumbent judges who appear alone on the ballot—not facing 
                                                     
 48. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and 
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1063–64 (2010). 
 49. See Devins, supra note 44, at 1645–47. 
 50. A tribute to former New York Chief Judge Judith Kaye by her successor begins, “Judith S. 
Kaye’s constitutionally mandated retirement [as she had turned seventy] from the bench on 
December 31, 2008, brought to a premature end her magnificent twenty-five-year career on the New 
York Court of Appeals, including almost sixteen years as Chief Judge of the State of New York.”  
Jonathan Lippmann, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye: A Visionary Third Branch Leader, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 655, 655 (2009).  One might contrast this with the insistence of the terminally ill eighty-year-
old William Rehnquist on remaining Chief Justice of the United States until his death in July 2005. 
 51. An interesting exception is New Jersey, the topic of much discussion below.  In New Jersey, 
justices are initially appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court by the Governor and with the 
confirmation of the Senate for a seven-year term, at which time they are eligible for, and almost 
always are given, an appointment until the retirement age of seventy.  See Devins, supra note 44, at 
1676 n.248.  Recently, the newly inaugurated Republican Governor of New Jersey refused to 
reappoint a member of the court—who happened to be the one African-American member—on the 
grounds that the justice in question was presumably exemplary of what the new Governor “described 
[as an] historically liberal court [that went] ‘out of control’ over the last three decades, usurping the 
roles of the governor and the Legislature in setting social and tax policies.”  Richard Pérez-Peña, 
Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice from Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A22, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/nyregion/04christie.html.  The Times story 
concludes, “Mr. Christie will have a chance to reshape the court.  In his four-year term, five of its 
seven members (including Justice Wallace) will reach either mandatory retirement or the end of their 
initial seven-year appointments.”  Id.  For what it is worth, I was surprised during a 2009 visit to 
Australia to discover that the Prime Minister—presumably with the consent of the Cabinet—
apparently had carte blanche with regard to naming the new Chief Justice of the Australian High 
Court. 
 52. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, 74 MO. L. 
REV. 479, 486 (2009). 
 53. DINAN, supra note 45, at 135. 
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what might be termed “live opposition.”54  All three had recently joined 
in a unanimous decision of the Iowa Supreme Court that found same-sex 
marriage to be protected by the Iowa Constitution, altogether 
independently of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.55  No state has abolished judicial review, although 
Kentucky attempted to do so for a brief time in the 1820s;56 two states, 
however, North Dakota and Nebraska, require supermajority votes in 
order to invalidate a state law as unconstitutional.57 
In contrast to the United States Constitution, which has been 
construed by the Supreme Court to require “cases and controversies” and 
therefore to prohibit advisory opinions on pending legislation,58 the 
supreme courts of eight states are authorized or even required to render 
such opinions.59  As Robert Williams has written, “when state supreme 
courts issue advisory opinions, they act more like European 
constitutional courts than the United States Supreme Court.”60  
Moreover—note I don’t say “finally”—there is the fact that it is easier to 
amend the constitution of every state than it is to amend the United 
States Constitution, which is, indeed, the hardest-to-amend constitution 
in the entire world.61 
One example of this was recently seen in California, where 
Proposition 8 overturned a decision of the California Supreme Court 
                                                     
 54. See A. G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html (quoting Bob Vander Plaats, 
who led the campaign against the judges after losing his race for the Republican nomination for 
governor, speaking to “a crowd of cheering supporters at an election night party peppered with red 
signs declaring ‘No Activist Judges’”: “‘I think [the Iowa vote] will send a message across the 
country that the power resides with the people.  It’s we the people, not we the courts.’”).  The 
shockwaves could certainly be felt, so to speak, at the Kansas Law Review symposium held just ten 
days later.  See Todd. E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three 
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715 (2011); see also Editorial, A Blow to the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
9, 2010, at A34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/opinion/09tue3.html (arguing that 
“[t]his year’s campaign is one more reminder of why the 39 states that hold judicial elections should 
scrap them in favor of merit screening and appointment of judges for a long fixed term.”). 
 55. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
 56. Theodore W. Ruger, “A Question Which Convulses a Nation”: The Early Republic’s 
Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 827, 850–55 (2004). 
 57. The supermajority requires four out of five justices in North Dakota and five out of seven in 
Nebraska.  DINAN, supra note 45, at 134. 
 58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1976). 
 59. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 296. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 261 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995).  This title used to be held by the Yugoslav Constitution, which, of course, is no 
longer operative.  Id. 
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establishing a right, under the California constitution, to same-sex 
marriage.62  It is of telling significance that the Proposition was placed on 
the ballot by “popular initiative”—without the assent of the California 
legislature—and then adopted by a majority vote in the ensuing general 
election.63  At the very least, this demonstrates the ability of an aroused 
majority to overrule what would otherwise be binding constructions of 
the state constitution by simple majority vote.  Thus, one author has 
written that state judiciaries by and large exemplify “the majoritarian 
difficulty” rather than the converse that so dominates discussion of the 
Supreme Court: “The majoritarian difficulty asks not how 
unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to 
democracy, but rather how elected/accountable judges can be justified in 
a regime committed to constitutionalism.”64  All of this amply supports 
Professor Hershkoff’s comment that “state court decisions are not the last 
word in a political conversation, but rather the first, opening a dialogue 
with the legislature and the people and spurring the development of 
shared solutions to important public problems.”65  One might regard 
these “uniquely American”66 features of state judiciaries—and the wider 
political structure of which they are a part—with pleasure, horror, or 
Olympian indifference, but it is hard to believe that they do not generate 
quite different kinds of dialogue from those generated, say, by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
One might also suspect that state judges, even those serving on their 
highest courts, are less cosmopolitan or otherwise drawn from national 
elites than—certainly—United States Supreme Court justices.  By the 
same token, I strongly suspect, although have not done the research to 
demonstrate, that more state supreme court justices have had some kind 
of political career prior to their joining the judiciary than, most certainly, 
is currently the case for the United States Supreme Court, which, since 
the retirement of Sandra Day O’Connor, lacks for the first time in its 
history anyone who has ever successfully—or perhaps even 
                                                     
 62. See, e.g., Tamera Audi et al., California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122586056759900673.html. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995), quoted in Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State 
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1160 n.163 
(1999). 
 65. Hershkoff, supra note 64, at 1169.  One notes how closely Friedman tracks this language in 
his book, but, I must say, I think there is far greater explanation of how and why a “dialogical 
model” might be present in states than at the level of the Supreme Court. 
 66. Shugerman, supra note 48, at 1064. 
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unsuccessfully—run for any political office.67  This is in vivid contrast to 
earlier courts, whose ranks have notably included, in the twentieth 
century alone, a former Governor of New York and candidate for the 
presidency in Charles Evans Hughes, a former President of the United 
States in William Howard Taft, and a former Governor of California who 
was a candidate for the vice presidency in 1948 in Earl Warren, not to 
mention such distinguished senators as George Sutherland and Hugo 
Black.  President Obama’s two selections for the Court did nothing to 
change this situation, whatever their undoubted strengths might have 
been.68  It is hard to believe that such experience is irrelevant to the 
perspectives that judges take, especially when faced with cases that 
obviously implicate important issues of public policy in which designing 
what are thought to be effective remedies to implement the Constitution 
present far more of a challenge than churning out an argument about 
what abstract rights are—or are not—protected by the Constitution 
itself.69 
Quite frankly, it is equally hard to believe that the take-charge-and-
do-something-about-problems attitude often associated with successful 
politicians does not transfer over in significant measure to service as a 
judge, whatever conventional wisdom might suggest about judicial 
restraint.  A recent article by Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist has 
adverted to specific “judicial types,” including, in a term initially 
proffered by Professor J. Woodford Howard, judicial “innovators” who 
“‘felt obliged to make law whenever the opportunity occurs.’”70  This 
may be particularly telling in state courts, which, of course, are charged 
with continuing common-law decisionmaking and creation, where self-
                                                     
 67. On the backgrounds of state judges, see the report on a sixteen-state study of state supreme 
courts conducted by Robert Kagan, Lawrence Friedman, and Stanton Wheeler in the 1970s.  Robert 
A. Kagan et al., American State Supreme Court Justices, 1900–1970, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
371.  Among other things, less than half of state supreme court judges sitting between 1950 and 
1970 had as much as five years prior judicial experience before reaching the highest court.  Id. at 
376. 
 68. As it happens, the current Supreme Court is also the first one since its creation in 1789 to 
lack even a single member with experience serving on a state court.  Both Justices O’Connor and 
Souter had served as judges in their home states of Arizona and New Hampshire, respectively.  In 
addition, Justice Brennan, perhaps the most important post-World War II liberal justice, had been a 
distinguished member of the New Jersey Supreme Court prior to his 1956 selection by President 
Eisenhower for the United States Supreme Court. 
 69. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) 
(discussing the challenge for Supreme Court Justices of “developing a workable doctrinal 
structure”). 
 70. Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1415 (2009) 
(quoting J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 160 
(1981)). 
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conscious policy considerations are deemed more appropriate than in the 
peculiar world of federal courts. 
Cross and Lindquist also offer the linked notion of the “judicial 
entrepreneur,” who, like “policy entrepreneurs” more generally, delight 
“‘in identifying problems and finding solutions.’”71  “Like any 
entrepreneur,” Cross and Lindquist write, “to be successful the judge 
must have a product that appeals to the relevant market and must be able 
to effectively sell that product.”72  Thus, “dialogue” may be just another 
name for what is in effect an advertising campaign, by which 
innovative—or, if one wishes, “activist” or “rampaging”—jurists try to 
sell their ideas to some mixture, depending on the specifics of the 
political system, of public officials and the public in general as part of an 
effort to address what the judge believes to be a pressing problem facing 
the polity.  Indeed, not only might one expect former politicos to be more 
likely to embark on “entrepreneurial” efforts, one might even expect 
them to be better at it inasmuch as they would have had to run for office 
and persuade possibly resistant voters of the merits of their positions.  If, 
as almost every American lawyer believes, the “life of the law” has at 
least as much to do with experience as with logic, then one would expect 
these differential experiences to be relevant.  Whatever one thinks of 
present members of the United States Supreme Court, there is no reason 
to believe that any of them possesses a demonstrated capacity to speak to 
mass audiences or even practicing politicians and to persuade them to 
give the judges’ own nostrums a try. 
This being said, it is noteworthy that at least two of the current 
justices, Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, seem increasingly to be 
engaged in self-conscious public campaigns to generate general support 
for their views of the Constitution.  The path was certainly forged by 
Scalia, who often seems to be less interested in civil dialogue with his 
colleagues than in speaking “out of doors” to what political scientists call 
“attentive publics” who can mobilize social and political movements 
supporting his particular constitutional agenda.73  Breyer has apparently 
realized that one must, in effect, fight fire with fire, as evidenced not 
only by the publication of a recent book defending his own distinct 
                                                     
 71. Id. at 1419 (quoting NELSON W. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN AMERICA: THE 
POLITICS OF POLICY INITIATION 171 (1984)); see also WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, 
JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 1–22 
(1997) (discussing the concept of judicial entrepreneurship). 
 72. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 70, at 1420. 
 73. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 565–68 (2006). 
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perspective on constitutional matters—very much in opposition to 
Scalia’s74—but also his equally distinctive willingness to go on such 
programs as Larry King’s CNN show to discuss the book.75  It is 
noteworthy as well that both Scalia and Breyer engaged in a joint 
“conversation” before a 4500-person audience at the Texas Tech School 
of Law, where they each, in effect, made their campaign pitches even 
though, obviously, they have lifetime tenure and, unlike the Iowa and 
other state judges, need not fear retribution from the electorate.76  It may 
be the case that judges who insist that their opinions speak for 
themselves and that it is undignified—or even a breach of judicial 
ethics—to defend one’s views before the local Rotary Club and the like 
will be increasingly viewed as relics of a dying political culture, similar 
to presidential candidates who remained on their front porches and 
counted on surrogates to engage in the grubby task of persuading the 
voters to support them.  If we can see this happening with justices of the 
United States Supreme Court, this would presumably be far likelier with 
regard to state court judges who must worry about remaining in the good 
graces of a potentially mercurial electorate. 
There are, of course, also important substantive differences 
between—and among—most state constitutions and the United States 
Constitution.  Consider, for example, the fact that only two of the fifty 
states have a so-called “unitary executive” in which the governor 
appoints the state’s attorney general and may remove him at will.77  Even 
if one stipulates, for sake of argument, the dubious proposition that the 
correct interpretation of the United States Constitution is the requirement 
of a “unitary executive,”78 it is simply demonstrably false to say that 
conception of the executive branch is embedded in American political 
thought, given its overwhelming rejection by over ninety-five percent of 
the American states.  Far more relevant to this essay, however, is another 
important substantive difference, which involves the character of the 
rights that are protected by the respective constitutions. 
                                                     
 74. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
(2010) (describing Breyer’s perspective). 
 75. See ICYMI: Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, LARRY KING LIVE (Sept. 16, 2010), 
http://larrykinglive.blogs.cnn.com/2010/09/16/icymi-supreme-court-justice-stephen-breyer/. 
 76. See Brooke Bellomy, Justices Scalia, Breyer Speak at Lecture Series, DAILY TOREADOR 
(Lubbock, TX), Nov. 14, 2010, available at http://www.dailytoreador.com/news/article_7bf7c942-
f04a-11df-b524-0017a4a78c22.html. 
 77. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys 
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006) (noting that 
“[o]nly in Alaska and Wyoming does the Attorney General serve entirely at the Governor’s behest”). 
 78. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3–9 (2008). 
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It is a notorious truth about the United States Constitution that it is 
distinctly a “first-stage” exemplar of constitutionalism, written in the late 
Eighteenth century, when such constitutional rights as were deemed 
worthy of protection against state invasion were “negative rights” 
dealing with personal liberties.79  If “second-stage” constitutionalism 
focused as well on what might be termed “participatory rights,” such as 
the right to vote or serve as a governmental official, then the modern age 
of constitutionalism, for better or—some would undoubtedly say—for 
worse has taken us to a “third stage” involving so-called “social” or 
“positive rights.”  Cass Sunstein recently wrote of the desirability of 
complementing the 1791 Bill of Rights by adopting Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s vision, articulated over sixty years ago, of a “second [social] 
bill of rights.”80  No longer does the citizen want only, or even 
necessarily most of all, “the right to be let alone,” described by Justice 
Brandeis as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by civilized men,”81 or even the fundamental right to participate in 
choosing and serving in one’s government.  Instead, the citizen, under 
this model, wants certain kinds of affirmative protections by the state 
against the vicissitudes of fate—what has come to be called the “welfare 
state.”82 
It is difficult to find constitutions drafted after World War II, 
“liberal” or “illiberal,” that do not include some of these welfarist 
provisions.  Ironically or not, even constitutions drafted under the 
influence of the United States, such as the present Iraqi constitution, 
include constitutional guarantees going far beyond anything that can be 
found in the United States Constitution itself.  Consider only Article 34, 
which first proclaims education to be “a fundamental factor in the 
progress of society” and then declares that “[f]ree education is a right for 
all Iraqis in all its stages.”83  As every American law student knows, any 
such interpretation of the United States Constitution was rejected by a 
majority of the Supreme Court in a well-known 1973 case; whatever else 
                                                     
 79. See, e.g., T. H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 10–18 
(1950). 
 80. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (2005). 
 81. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
 82. Given the recent prominence of libertarian politicians, such as newly elected Senator Rand 
Paul of Kentucky, it is altogether possible that at least some citizens are perfectly satisfied with the 
Brandeisian right of being left alone and have no wish whatsoever for a “safety-net” state responsive 
to welfare needs. 
 83. Article 34, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 
2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101 
201450.html. 
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might be said about education, it was not a “fundamental right” or 
“interest” meriting judicial oversight—and intervention—regarding the 
adequacy or equality of state educational systems.84  At the very least, 
“the majority in Rodriguez tolerated the continuation of a funding system 
that allowed serious disparities in the quality of the education a child 
received based solely on the wealth of the community in which his 
parents happened to live or could afford to live.”85  But it is unclear, as a 
constitutional matter, that the national Constitution, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, requires the state to operate a public school system at all, 
any more, say, than the state is required to operate a zoo or swimming 
pools.  It would certainly not be shocking, in a descriptive legal sense, if 
the current majority of the Supreme Court believes that the provision of 
such goods might well, as a constitutional matter, be left entirely to the 
market, should that be the legislators’ decision, with attendant 
consequences for those without sufficient resources to purchase the 
goods in question.  If one takes the language of the Iraqi constitution 
seriously, that option is unavailable there. 
III. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION AS EXEMPLIFYING “DIALOGUE” 
As I’ve already suggested, one makes a profound error in confining 
one’s understanding of American constitutionalism to the national 
Constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme Court.  As Professor 
Hershkoff writes, “every state constitution in the United States addresses 
social and economic concerns, and provides the basis for a variety of 
positive claims against the government. . . . [M]ore than a dozen state 
constitutions provide explicit protections for the poor.”86  Almost 
certainly the most important such right is education.  According to 
Professor Dinan, “[e]ducation has long been considered the 
responsibility of state and local governments,”87 and state constitutions 
                                                     
 84. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
 85. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Essay, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its 
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1971 (2008); see also Richard Schragger, San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez and the Legal Geography of School Finance Reform, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 85 
(Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2008). 
 86. Hershkoff, supra note 64, at 1135; see also Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law 
and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 
1523–24 (2010) (listing specific positive rights guaranteed by various state constitutions); Emily 
Zackin, Positive Constitutional Rights in the United States (Nov. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author) (an invaluable review of the positive rights 
tradition in American state constitutions). 
 87. DINAN, supra note 45, at 237. 
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place upon states at least some affirmative duties to provide education to 
the young.  As Dinan notes, the debates at various state constitutional 
conventions concerned not only the desirability of ensuring sufficient 
intellectual or vocational training, but also the role that education played 
in creating a sufficiently virtuous citizen, what Dinan calls the “moral 
development” of unformed youngsters.88  This surely helps to explain 
why “[a]bout one-fourth of state spending on average, or about $275 
billion, goes toward public education.”89  And, incidentally, the 
undoubted relationship between education and moral development—or, 
at least, political socialization—helps further to explain why public 
dialogue about education might be especially intense and often 
acrimonious. 
It should, then, occasion no surprise at all that Rodriguez in 1973 
was scarcely the last word regarding litigation concerning the adequacy 
of America’s public school systems.  Although one might read Rodriguez 
as having given all of the American states “the green light”90 to continue 
the status quo in (inegalitarian) funding of public education, most states 
did not in fact continue in their usual practices.  Instead, what Rodriguez 
did was to displace such litigation from the federal courts to state courts, 
where lawyers relied on state constitutional law instead of federal law—
save, of course, when litigation involved alleged racial discrimination, 
which certainly was a subject for analysis under the national 
Constitution, but for reasons having little or nothing to do with the 
specifics of education.91  Indeed, Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his 
anguished dissent in Rodriguez, explicitly noted that “nothing in the 
Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state educational 
funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”92  Few, if any, 
lawyers felt inhibited.  As Douglas Reed notes, the constitutions of 
“[f]orty-nine of fifty states have an education clause that specifies some 
required level of public education; many, in fact, declare public 
                                                     
 88. Id. at 238. 
 89. Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2783 (last updated Mar. 19, 2010). 
 90. Sutton, supra note 85, at 1971. 
 91. Original readers of Brown v. Board of Education would easily be forgiven for believing that 
the case—and therefore the Equal Protection Clause it interpreted—was significantly about 
education.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  After all, Brown referred to 
“education [as] perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,” with 
compulsory education laws, common in many state constitutions and statutes, plus the sheer dollar 
amounts of state budgets devoted to education “demonstrat[ing] our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society.”  Id. at 493. 
 92. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
LEVINSON FINAL 5/23/2011  6:44 PM 
812 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
education to be a fundamental state right.”93  To be sure, the specific 
language of the various constitutions may differ quite a bit, but these 
differences are less important than the reality of the language being 
found in the state constitution in the first place.94  This may suggest that 
another difference between state and federal courts is that state judges, 
for a variety of reasons that might be worth exploring, may be in general 
far less concerned with academic “theories of constitutional 
interpretation” than with pragmatically effective ways of confronting 
what are deemed to be important state problems such as those raised by 
public education. 
Thus the New Jersey Supreme Court, only twelve days after the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, issued a 
decision holding that the clause of the New Jersey Constitution requiring 
that the state operate a “thorough and efficient” system of public 
education was sufficient to warrant invalidation of the existing system of 
educational finance in the state.95  Equally relevant is that Robinson was 
the first of at least twenty-six decisions issued by the New Jersey state 
supreme court between 1973 and 2010 involving the financing of New 
Jersey schools.96  Similarly, as Richard Schragger has noted with regard 
to the extended aftermath of Rodriguez in its state of origin—Texas—
there have been a plethora of state supreme court cases, beginning in 
1989, that have confronted not only the abstract meaning of Texas’s 
commitment to “an efficient system of public schools,” as set out in its 
constitution, but also the actual response of the Texas legislature to one 
or another of the judicial decisions.97  Schragger describes a “pattern—
the state legislature adopting legislation and the courts striking down” 
that “would be repeated over the next twenty years” following the initial 
1989 decision.98  These facts should be of great interest to anyone 
interested in the actuality of dialogue—or bargaining—between courts  
                                                     
 93. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 55 (2001). 
 94. See Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme 
Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1174–75 (2000).  Swenson, after 
examination of an extensive data set, finds that “the strength of a state’s constitutional education 
clause is not related to the likelihood that a court will find a school finance scheme constitutional.”  
Id. at 1175. 
 95. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973); see also MICHAEL PARIS, FRAMING 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 67–73 (2010) 
(extensively parsing Robinson). 
 96. A full listing of the cases can be found in PARIS, supra note 95, at 310–12. 
 97. Schragger, supra note 85, at 104–07. 
 98. Id. at 104. 
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and either the public in general or other state institutions more 
particularly. 
In some ways, it is almost bizarre to look at the United States 
Supreme Court as a partner in serious dialogue; even on those relatively 
rare occasions when it treats an issue of genuine interest to the public at 
large,99 it rarely returns repeatedly to such issues.  Consider only that a 
full quarter-century elapsed before the Supreme Court took a successor 
case to the 1978 Bakke case involving “affirmative action” and higher 
education.100  And when, in 2003, the Court examined the undergraduate 
admissions system of the University of Michigan and a different 
admissions process used by the University of Michigan Law School, it 
split the baby in half by striking down the former and upholding the 
latter.101  It is clear that seven of the Justices believed this made no sense, 
but it didn’t matter, since they split four to three on what would make 
collective sense and the two remaining judges, Justices O’Connor and 
Breyer, managed to discern a distinction in the two programs that did not 
impress their colleagues.102  Indeed, to try to have even a classroom 
dialogue about these two cases guarantees only collective frustration, 
since the seven other justices are almost certainly correct, and one is 
forced to teach students the equivalent of how to conjugate a decidedly 
irregular English verb. 
If one is looking for dialogue from federal courts, the far better 
option, I suspect, is to look at circuit courts of appeal or, even more so, 
district courts.  After all, as I learned while clerking for a district judge, 
the most important thing a judge does is to implement constitutional 
norms by constructing remedies—what my colleague Mitchell Berman 
calls “decision rules” in contrast to “interpretations” of the 
                                                     
 99. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 32 (2006) (demonstrating the disconnect between what most interests the public and the 
topics addressed by the Supreme Court). 
 100. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  And, of course, there was no 
“Opinion for the Court” in Bakke.  Almost bizarrely, Justice Powell’s opinion, which was in fact 
rejected by all of his colleagues, became treated as the de facto opinion of the Court, at least until the 
opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood v. Texas, where Judge Smith, for the 
majority, emphasized that “Justice Powell’s view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue.  
While he announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the 
diversity rationale.”  78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003). 
 101. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (holding that the undergraduate admissions 
process violated the Equal Protection Clause); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding the Michigan Law 
School process did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 102. See Robert P. George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634, 
1634–35 (2003). 
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Constitution.103  The United States Supreme Court is often content to 
write cryptic opinions enunciating some version of a right,104 while 
leaving it up to what the Constitution calls “inferior courts” actually to 
figure out how to instantiate the right,105 with minimal actual guidance 
from the Court and only sporadic intervention thereafter with regard to 
anything these “inferior” judges might do.106  One might, of course, 
speak of a dialogue between the Supreme Court and courts lower in the 
judicial bureaucracy, though, as a practical matter, one might wonder 
exactly how seriously many of the ostensibly subordinate judges take 
Delphic utterances107 from Washington, given their knowledge that the 
Supreme Court now takes extremely few cases to review.  Over ninety-
nine percent of all cases come to an end well short of the Supreme 
Court.108  And, as suggested earlier, any such dialogue is distinctly 
                                                     
 103. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004). 
 104. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating a 
right to public education must be given to all on equal terms). 
 105. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 106. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court; Justices Long on Words  but  Short on 
Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/ 
18/us/18rulings.html?_r=1&scp=AdamLiptakonjudicialopinions&st=cse. 
 107. I cannot forbear quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam’s own discussion of the Delphic Oracle, 
based on Par Lagerkvist’s The Sibyl: 
[T]he role of the Pythia, or priestess of the Oracle at Delphi, was of incomparable 
grandeur and futility.  This young maiden was periodically lashed to a tripod above a 
noisome abyss, wherein her God dwelt and from which nauseating odors rose and 
assaulted her.  There the God entered her body and soul, so that she thrashed madly and 
uttered inspired, incomprehensible cries.  The cries were interpreted by the corps of 
professional priests of the Oracle, and their interpretations were, of course, for mere 
mortals the word of the God. 
The Pythia . . . was viewed with utmost reverence and abhorrence; enormous importance 
attached to her every utterance; but from the practical point of view, what she said didn’t 
matter much . . . . 
To some extent, this Pythian metaphor describes the Supreme Court’s functioning in all 
the fields of law with which it deals. 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Rights of Suspects, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY 
ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 401, 401–02 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971). 
 108. Professors Songer, Sheehan, and Haire report that, of the nearly 4000 decisions rendered by 
three circuits studied over the course of 1986, only nineteen, or less than half of one percent, were 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, and of these, only two-thirds were reversed, for a net non-reversal 
rate of 99.7%.  DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS 17 (2000).  One might well believe that the likelihood of review has in fact 
gone down since 1986, inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court is in fact taking significantly 
fewer cases—in part because it has almost complete control over its own docket.  Thus, for the 2008 
term of the Court, the justices granted review in a total of eighty-seven of the 7868 appeals filed 
(1.1%).  The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 389 (2009).  
Overall, the Supreme Court in that term issued the fewest number of written opinions since 1953.  
Linda Greenhouse, On the Court That Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest Mark, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2008, at A1.  See also generally Symposium, Important Questions of Federal Law: 
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constrained by the fact that the Supreme Court can quash any suggestion, 
however reasonable, by one of its “inferiors” should there be five votes, 
for whatever reason, to reject it.  In any event, if one is looking at the 
federal level for truly inter-institutional dialogue between the judiciary 
and other political institutions, my money would be on the usually 
unheralded, and minimally studied, district courts,109 or, with regard to 
administrative law, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  
That being said, I suspect that one will find many more examples of such 
dialogues—or whatever one might wish to call them—when scrutinizing 
the work of state courts. 
But the sheer number of New Jersey or Texas decisions concerning 
the financing of their public school systems is not the only important 
thing worth noting.  Also significant with regard to New Jersey, I think, 
is the fact that the state’s Democratic Governor nominated as Chief 
Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court in December 1973 his 
predecessor, two-term Democratic Governor Richard Hughes, a 
dedicated liberal who had suffered a stinging political defeat—by one 
vote in the New Jersey Senate—in his efforts to bring an income tax to 
New Jersey.110  He was confirmed by the New Jersey Senate and took 
office in 1974,111 just after the initial decision in Cahill, but not too late 
to become a shaping force in the extended dialogue that took place 
between the Court and the New Jersey legislature and governor.  As the 
New York Times stated in Hughes’s obituary, “he was to play a key role 
in the enactment of the income tax” that he had unsuccessfully fought for 
as Governor, because of Cahill: 
After Mr. Hughes was named Chief Justice by Gov. William T. Cahill 
in 1974, the court began prodding the Legislature to find a way to 
eliminate the inequities. 
 After Gov. Brendan T. Byrne and the Legislature battled for months 
over Mr. Byrne’s proposal to enact an income tax, the Hughes-led court 
stepped into the controversy.  In June 1976, the court ordered the 
                                                                                                                       
Assessing the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2010), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/26/. 
 109. See generally, e.g., JOSHUA M. DUNN, COMPLEX JUSTICE: THE CASE OF MISSOURI V. 
JENKINS (2008) (detailing the complex litigation history of a case involving Kansas City, Missouri, 
ultimately resolved in a five to four decision by the United States Supreme Court, 515 U.S. 70 
(1995)). 
 110. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Richard J. Hughes, Governor and Judge, Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 1992, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/08/us/richard-j-hughes-governor-
and-judge-dies-at-83.html?pagewanted=2. 
 111. Id. 
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closing of New Jersey’s public schools until a new financing plan was 
approved.  The decision broke the back of the opposition to the income 
tax.  It was enacted and the schools were reopened.112 
To put it mildly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the United 
States Supreme Court engaging in this kind of “constitutional 
showdown”113 with the New Jersey legislature. 
I have already adverted to the extended dialogue that occurred 
between the state court and legislature in New Jersey, which is certainly 
not unique, as Michael Paris demonstrates in his book-length study of 
New Jersey and Kentucky, both of which saw dramatic constitutionally 
based decisions by their respective state supreme courts.114  And, if one 
adds Texas to this mix, we discover that the ensuing dialogue following 
judicial decisions included, at least some of the time, on both sides, 
politically sophisticated individuals.  Chief Justice Hughes may well 
have been exceptional.  He was, apparently, widely respected by 
politicians of both parties and by the public in general.  His successor, 
Robert Wilentz, was a member of a politically active family—his father, 
according to the New York Times, “was a legendary Democratic Party 
power in New Jersey”—who had served two terms in the New Jersey 
legislature during the 1960s.115  Appointed Chief Justice to succeed 
Richard Hughes in 1979, he was the subject of an intense confirmation 
struggle because of alleged judicial activism in 1986 when he was 
reappointed by Republican Governor Thomas Kean, but he was approved 
for reappointment by a twenty-one to nineteen vote.116  “What made 
Justice Wilentz an effective chief justice, in the opinion of those who 
followed his career, was his ability to see political realities and his 
willingness to push for regulatory and administrative machinery to 
enforce the court’s decrees.  ‘He didn’t just make decisions and leave 
others to see to them,’” said one experienced New Jerseyite, who went  
                                                     
 112. Id. 
 113. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 991 (2008) (discussing the concept of “constitutional showdowns”). 
 114. See generally PARIS, supra note 95 (comparing the leading school finance reform cases in 
New Jersey and Kentucky). 
 115. David Stout, Robert Wilentz, 69, New Jersey Chief Justice, Dies; Court Aided Women and 
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1996, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/ 
24/nyregion/robert-wilentz-69-new-jersey-chief-justice-dies-court-aided-women-and-the-poor.html? 
pagewanted=2. 
 116. Id. 
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on to describe him as “‘a realistic politician who was willing to do the 
right thing.’”117 
It is worth noting similarities with Texas and Kentucky.  Oscar 
Mauzy, a prominent liberal Democratic member of the Texas Senate, 
was elected to the Texas Supreme Court in 1987, and there can be little 
doubt that Mauzy viewed his membership on the court as an opportunity 
to achieve at least some of the goals that he had unsuccessfully 
advocated in the Texas legislature.118  He would be joined in 1989 by 
Lloyd Doggett, a similarly liberal state senator who had been defeated in 
an effort to become Texas’s senator in Washington.119  Doggett would 
leave the court in 1994, when he was elected to the national House of 
Representatives.120  A Republican justice, John Cornyn, who served one 
term between 1991 and 1997, left to run, successfully, to become 
Attorney General of Texas, and he was subsequently elected to the 
United States Senate.121  Indeed, Professor Paris has commented that 
when “[l]ooking at [Texas] school finance, I often had the sense that I 
was looking at an additional legislative branch—politicians passing 
through.”122  
Similarly, Kentucky Chief Justice Robert Stephens had, prior to his 
joining that state’s highest court in 1979—by appointment of the 
Governor—been elected Attorney General of Kentucky in 1975.123  
Interestingly enough, and illustrating yet another difference from the 
United States Supreme Court, Stephens was elected chief justice in 1982 
by his fellow justices.124  One of the very few defects of the two leading 
books on the school finance litigation by political scientists is insufficient 
attention to such biographical facts about the judges presiding over their 
respective courts.  One should not reduce these—or other—judges 
simply to their biographies, but it is a mistake to ignore their political 
careers, especially if, as part of a comparative project, one is interested in 
                                                     
 117. Id. 
 118. See Oscar Mauzy, TEXAS STATE CEMETERY, http://www.cemetery.state.tx.us/pub/ 
user_form.asp?pers_id=5978 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 119. Lloyd Doggett (D), WASH. POST: POSTPOLITICS, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/ 
congress/members/D000399 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Biography: Senator John Cornyn, SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, http://www.johncornyn. 
com/bio (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 122. E-mail from Michael Paris to Sanford Levinson (May 17, 2010, 5:59 PM) (on file with 
author). 
 123. Former Chief Justice Robert Stephens Dies, DAILY NEWS (Bowling Green, KY), Apr. 14, 
2002, at 7A, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1696&dat=20020414&id 
=EP4aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IEgEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5709,1299362. 
 124. Id. 
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distinguishing those states whose courts proved receptive to “reformist” 
law suits and those that did not. 
After all, Professor Paris notes that since the 1973 defeat in the 
United States Supreme Court by those seeking reform in the funding of 
public education, “school finance litigation has been sustained, 
widespread, and ongoing.”125  By 2007, “lawsuits challenging state 
school finance systems had reached the high courts” of forty-three of the 
fifty American states.126  Plaintiffs—self-styled “reformers”—“prevailed 
in court in twenty-six states, and they have failed in seventeen.”127  As 
one might imagine, there might well be different notions of what it 
means to have “prevailed,” especially if one is interested in translating 
judicial paragraphs into changes on the ground that truly affect the lives 
of one’s clients.  Hovering over this essay is the argument made most 
notably—or notoriously—in Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can 
Courts Bring About Social Change?, which answered its subtitled 
interrogatory in the negative.128  Rosenberg appears to reject the 
plausibility of any strongly dialogical model of the judiciary, at least if 
we imagine a genuinely two-way dialogue in which courts might truly 
change the opinions and then the actions of the broad public to whom, by 
stipulation, they are speaking.  If the audience for judicial opinions is 
confined to the specific litigants, then it is difficult to know exactly what 
“dialogue” might mean or, more to the point, why anyone would believe 
it is particularly important. 
In any event, the educational finance cases offer a wonderful basis 
for examining a variety of questions that should be of interest to 
constitutional scholars, regardless of their particular methodologies.  Is 
the primary explanation of the differences among the various states the 
political identity of state justices, whether “Democrat or Republican,” 
“liberal or conservative?”  Should we address the presence of 
“innovative” or “entrepreneurial” judges in one set of states as against 
the others? 
More traditional lawyers might wish to focus on the internal 
language of the respective state constitutions and the opinions construing 
them.  The various state constitutions offer a wide variety of examples.  I 
                                                     
 125. PARIS, supra note 95, at 46. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  Judge Sutton, in his 2008 article, indicates that “as of June 2008, forty-five States have 
faced state-constitutional challenges to their systems of funding public schools,” of which twenty-
eight were successful.  Sutton, supra note 85, at 1974. 
 128. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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have already adverted to the New Jersey Constitution, with its injunction 
that the state provide a “thorough and efficient” program of public 
education,129 while Texans are informed by their constitution that “[a] 
general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the 
liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of 
the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and 
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.”130  Kentucky 
is quite laconic: “The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, 
provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the 
State.”131 
America’s oldest operating constitution, older even than the national 
Constitution, is the Massachusetts Constitution, drafted in 1780 by John 
Adams.  It expansively—and charmingly—notes that: 
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among 
the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their 
rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities 
and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and 
among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of 
legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, 
and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, 
public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage private 
societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the 
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, 
manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to countenance and 
inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public 
and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in 
their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and 
generous sentiments among the people.132 
As a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court put it, “The McDuffy 
case133 was essentially an interpretation of a single word in the 
Massachusetts constitution, . . . ‘cherish.’  Was it mandatory or 
                                                     
 129. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 130. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 131. KY. CONST. § 183. 
 132. MASS. CONST. ch. V, § II. 
 133. See McDuffy v. Sec’y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555–56 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the 
Massachusetts educational system was indeed subject to judicial scrutiny).  The court later withdrew 
from the area in Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Mass. 2005) (holding that 
Massachusetts was meeting its constitutional charge to cherish the interests of public schools). 
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aspirational?  If it was aspirational, . . . it doesn’t mean much.”134  On the 
other hand, “[i]f the word was mandatory, courts can get involved, issue 
judgments, enforce them, and consider broad relief.”135 
Another difference between the United States Constitution and a 
number of state constitutions is that the latter are often considerably 
younger, not because new states have been recently admitted, but, rather, 
because states are quite willing to subject their constitutions to scrutiny 
and, on occasion, to replace an existing constitution with what is 
considered to be a document more suitable to the time.136  One of the 
newest state constitutions is that of Montana, adopted in 1972.  The 
education section, entitled “Educational Goals and Duties,” reads as 
follows: 
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which 
will develop the full educational potential of each person.  Equality of 
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state. 
. . . 
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public 
elementary and secondary schools.  The legislature may provide such 
other educational institutions, public libraries, and educational 
programs as it deems desirable.  It shall fund and distribute in an 
equitable manner to the school districts the state’s share of the cost of 
the basic elementary and secondary school system.137 
State courts might therefore feel some special legitimacy in 
enforcing positive rights clauses given that they might be said to express 
the will of the contemporary people.  It may not be surprising, then, that 
plaintiffs in Montana were able to prevail in suits testing the adequacy of 
the educational system.138 
                                                     
 134. MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS & KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE 
STATE COURTS 108 (2009). 
 135. Id. 
 136. A model, I fervently believe, that we should adopt at the national level. 
 137. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
 138. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 263 (Mont. 2005) 
(holding that the educational product of the state public school system did not satisfy the state 
constitutional requirement that the state provide quality public education); Helena Elementary Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) (holding that the state failed to provide a 
system of quality public education because the state failed to adequately fund the foundation 
program). 
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But, of course, one wonders how important these actual texts are as 
plausible explanations of wins and losses in given courts.  Even more can 
one wonder—and doubt—whether any of the respective courts exhibited 
any interest in the “original understanding,” however defined, of the 
drafters of the various constitutions.  One is entitled to be skeptical on 
both counts, at least as an initial hypothesis.139  Consider only Professor 
Paris’s description of Justice Stephens’s seminal opinion in Kentucky, 
which declared unconstitutional every aspect of the existing Kentucky 
system of public education:140  “In interpreting the meaning of the 
education clause of the Commonwealth’s constitution, the Court would 
elaborate and constitutionalize a set of fundamental principles only 
loosely tethered to the constitutional past.  It would speak the language 
of constitutional aspiration.”141  Very important is Professor Paris’s 
immediately following comment that this left “it to others to work out 
particular meanings in the days, years, and decades ahead.”142  One might 
well describe such an opinion, whatever its conformity to one’s favorite 
model of judicial opinion writing, as just the sort to encourage a free-
form dialogue. 
I will confess that the immediate free-association upon reading 
Professor Paris’s comment was to opinions of the South African 
Constitutional Court interpreting their own positive-rights provisions in 
the remarkable constitution drafted in 1994 to signify the new 
constitutional order that was to succeed the oppressive apartheid state.  
That constitution is impressive for its declaration of positive rights, but it 
is also obvious that the present Republic of South Africa can only 
“aspire” to fulfill any such promises.  Cass Sunstein has described that 
constitution as “the most admirable constitution in the history of the 
world,”143 not least because of its declaration of positive rights.  Yet 
Sunstein has also praised the South African Constitutional Court for its 
“minimalist” efforts to enforce such rights inasmuch as their opinions—
while acknowledging the existence and importance of the provisions—
seem only to require that the South African parliament make good-faith 
efforts over the years to adopt policies that might instantiate the 
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aspirations underlying the provisions.144  This is, it should be noted, 
different from those completely “aspirational” constitutions such as 
Ireland’s or India’s, which explicitly forbid courts from adjudicating the 
meaning and impact of the positive-rights provisions in those 
constitutions.  Any dialogue that will occur will be confined, 
presumably, to Irish and Indian legislators, unlike the case in South 
Africa (or Kentucky?). 
It should be clear that any full treatment of the questions raised 
above—and the answers provided by what is now four decades of 
litigation in forty-five states—would require a far longer book than those 
written by Professors Reed and Paris, on which I am heavily drawing.  
Rather, I want to conclude by offering some of my own reflections about 
dialogue that have been provoked by my reading of these two excellent 
books and, perhaps, the experience of living in Texas throughout the 
“Edgewood era” following Justice Mauzy’s 1989 decision. 
One conclusion upon reading this literature is that, to some degree at 
least, Gerald Rosenberg is simply wrong.  The public education systems 
of a number of states were significantly affected by litigation attacking 
especially the existing systems of school finance.  In at least one state, 
New Jersey, this led ultimately to the adoption of a state income tax, one 
of the most contentious subjects on the state’s political agenda.145  The 
Texas legislature, for example, has proved absolutely unwilling to 
consider any such radical legislation, which means that schools in Texas 
continue to be funded substantially by property taxes, with important 
political ramifications.146  That being said, and even though Texas has 
become quite decisively Republican since the days of Edgewood I in 
1989—indeed, Justice Mauzy was defeated in his 1992 bid for reelection 
to the court and, subsequently, the court became entirely Republican, 
with various consequences for the theories adopted with regard to the 
continuing school finance cases—school funding has changed 
substantially, at least if measured by both absolute and relative dollar 
amounts.  Thus, in 1989, Texas’s wealthiest districts spent $19,333 per 
student, whereas only $2112 per student were available to the poorest 
districts.147  By 1995, when Mauzy was off the Court and Edgewood IV 
came down, “the state equalized the funding for eighty-five percent of 
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the students at any given tax rate, with the richest schools outpacing the 
poorest by only $600.”148  And the shift to greater state responsibility for 
school funding has survived the Republican takeover of statewide 
politics.149 
San Antonio’s specific story in this regard is especially interesting, 
though one has to be attentive to the fact that major political changes 
were also taking place that, for example, produced San Antonio’s first 
Hispanic mayor and majority city council.150  In any event, “[i]n 2003–
2004, state aid helped Edgewood outspend Alamo Heights [the richest 
school district in the San Antonio area] $8,670 to $8,201, and both 
exceeded the statewide average of $7,784 per student.”151  Richard 
Schragger notes the limits of such moves toward equality: “Edgewood 
[which continues to be ninety-two percent Hispanic, with twenty-five 
percent of its students below the poverty line] test scores are still far 
below those in Alamo Heights [which is seventy-five percent Anglo and 
only four percent poor].”152  Alas, this conforms with the general pattern 
that “[a]cross metropolitan areas, schools are highly segregated, and 
performance differences between inner-city schools and suburban 
schools are striking.”153  Perhaps one would be resistant to seeing this 
new glass as even half-full, but it appears difficult to deny that some 
significant changes have taken place and that various state courts are at 
least part of the explanation. 
Almost no one today would accept a model of judicial supremacy, 
especially at the state level, in which courts speak and the rest of the 
political system listens attentively and changes relevant behaviors to 
satisfy the judges.  So what does explain some of these changes beyond 
the sheer power of the court?  Michael Paris’s fascinating book Framing 
Equal Opportunity: Law and the Politics of School Finance Reform, 
makes the very important point that litigation strategies in New Jersey 
and Kentucky, in particular, were significantly different.154  From a 
lawyer’s perspective, the most important of the differences involved the 
nature of the legal arguments per se: New Jersey lawyers, for example, 
focused much more on the equitable issues involved in school finance 
and the patent inequalities of funds received by students depending on 
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whether they lived in rich or poor—which in New Jersey often correlated 
very heavily with white or African-American—cities,155 whereas 
Kentucky’s reforms emphasized almost exclusively whether all of 
Kentucky’s children were being given at least a minimally “adequate” 
education and satisfied the Kentucky Supreme Court that the answer was 
no.156  The Texas litigation, especially at its initial stages, was far more 
like New Jersey’s.  But Paris makes another extremely important 
argument, which may be of far more interest to political scientists and 
anyone interested in the nature of inter-institutional dialogue. 
Paris describes the New Jersey reformists, at least initially, as 
“legalists,” who did indeed fit Rosenberg’s model of placing extremely 
high hopes in the consequences of being able to prevail in court.157  
“Armed with nothing but the tools of their trade, a few lone-ranger 
attorneys would seek to produce social change by judicial decree.”158  To 
an astonishing degree, they were successful in prevailing before the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.159  But, as Paris notes, “the immediate results 
would be disappointing.” 160  But, recall, there were twenty-six 
subsequent opinions written by the court by 2009, and by the end of the 
process, even if the results continued to be disappointing from what 
might be termed, non-pejoratively, a “maximalist” perspective—as with 
Texas, no one argues that the contemporary New Jersey public school 
system is a model of social justice or necessarily “effective” education 
for all of its students—at least some poor (and African-American) 
students have presumably benefitted, and the reason for this is the ability 
of the initially “lone-ranger attorneys” to begin operating effectively with 
a variety of education-related interest groups and publics in order to 
confront the strong opposition to any significant reform at all.  But it did 
take a remarkably long time, one might believe, for the lawyers to 
recognize the importance of politics more generally.  Thus “until the 
early 1990s [twenty years after the initial litigation], the [Education Law 
Centerdirecting the litigation] never sought to use its litigation to 
organize new groups or to otherwise mobilize potential constituents in 
politics.”161  Particularly telling—and, from one perspective, appalling—
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as an illustration of “the ELC’s legalism” was its desire for what Paris 
terms “nominal, or phantom, clients,” that is, poor students who could be 
evoked but whose parents need not actually be consulted or, more to the 
point, organized as a genuine political force.162  “The ELC thereby 
enjoyed the moral authority of speaking for poor victimized children 
without having to answer to any live political organizations or formations 
about its litigation strategy and that strategy’s relationship to politics.”163  
Indeed, a recurring question in the literature involving “public-interest 
lawyering” is the degree to which the lawyers in fact pay very much 
attention to the expressed desires of their putative clients.164  Most 
would-be leaders—or “authorities”—in fact prefer “monologues,” at 
least if they are the speakers—and actors—over necessarily more messy 
“dialogues” that may threaten one’s own prerogatives. 
Even in New Jersey, though, the reformers could genuinely feel they 
had won substantial victories, described as “compelling” and even 
“stunning” by Paris.165  What we cannot know, of course, is whether this 
actually vindicates their strategy or whether a more overtly political 
strategy, designed to generate the kind of public dialogue that comes 
through strong participation of interest groups and potential voters, might 
have had even better results.  In any event, Paris describes a significantly 
different litigation strategy in Kentucky, where reformers developed not 
only a quite different image of what was at stake—saving the “common 
school” project rather than achieving abstract norms of distributive 
justice—but also, and crucially, a different conception of how to 
integrate litigation in a wider political movement.166  This becomes 
crucial in explaining the fact that within a year of the Kentucky Court’s 
momentous decision in 1989 declaring, in its own words, that 
“‘Kentucky’s entire system of common schools is unconstitutional,’”167 
the Kentucky legislature “passed an ambitious omnibus measure called 
the Kentucky Education Reform Act . . . [that] sought to change the 
whole education system, all at once.”168  Indeed, by 2005, “the school 
finance changes produced substantially higher education spending in 
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each school district and substantially more spending equally across all 
districts.”169  There was, as Paris notes, “very little resistance” to Rose;170 
there were no cries of judicial usurpation or invocations of the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”171 
Unlike his chapters on New Jersey, which often feature detailed 
examinations of judicial opinions, most of Paris’s chapters on Kentucky 
emphasize the overall political milieu.  By 1989, educational reformers 
had created a broad coalition, cutting across predictable lines, in favor of 
attacking—and changing—the existing public school system.172  
“Various educational interest groups had mobilized in support of the 
Council’s lawsuit.”173  So why was a lawsuit necessary at all?  The 
answer is that “an antitax governor and leading legislators had come to a 
stalemate over competing education reform programs and taxes.”174  The 
function of the Kentucky Supreme Court was in effect to “br[eak] this 
institutional logjam,” which, among other things, “provided the elected 
officials with cover on the tax question.  The court’s decision, then, did 
not create conditions conducive to reform but rather merely threw a 
much-needed spark into an already combustible mix of heightened 
agitation and conflict.”175  One cannot help but think once more of Mark 
Graber’s seminal work emphasizing the way that courts with some 
frequency take on certain political hot potatoes with the approval, if not 
the outright delight, of those in political power who cannot, for whatever 
reason, surmount a veto point generated by the complexities of American 
political institutions.176 
Paris notes, incidentally, that by staying away from issues of 
distributive justice in its opinion—and focusing instead only on the 
“quality” of Kentucky education—the Kentucky Court avoided the 
epithet that was quickly placed on the programs generated by having to 
respond to the explicitly equity-oriented decision of the Texas Supreme 
Court written by the strongly liberal Justice Oscar Mauzy.177  Legislative 
attempts to respond to the court were quickly termed “Robin Hood” bills, 
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since, as is true of all seriously redistributive legislation, it indeed took 
tax funds, generated through property taxes, from the rich, and gave them 
to far poorer students.178  Not surprisingly, there were recurrent 
showdowns between—and among—the Texas state legislature, Texas 
courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, and the public of Texas, 
given that constitutional amendments in Texas require ratification by the 
general public.  Thus, a proposition placed on the ballot by the Texas 
legislature that would have allowed consolidation—and thus pooling of 
property tax revenues—of independent school districts went down to 
stinging defeat in 1993, not least, one suspects, because “the major 
opposition group” named itself “Texans Against Robin Hood Taxes.”179 
In 1991, it is probably worth noting, the popular and widely 
respected Lieutenant Governor of Texas, William P. Hobby, had called 
for the electoral defeat of all nine Texas Supreme Court justices 
following the issuance of so-called Edgewood II, which appeared to call 
for Robin Hood policies as the means of enforcing the norms set out in 
the initial Edgewood decision in 1989.180  Furthermore, Professor Reed 
notes, the court responded to the controversy following Edgewood II by 
issuing, only four weeks later, yet another opinion “most likely in 
response to negative press and legislative reaction,” in which the court 
“changed its mind about a key element of the ‘Robin Hood’ proposal.”181  
Thus, Reed argues, the Texas Supreme Court, by failing “to provide 
policy leadership” or any “analytical clarity” that would “enunciate clear 
constitutional policy options for the state legislature, produced a 
protracted and bitter struggle that compounded an already difficult 
political situation.”182  Whatever one’s theory of “dialogue,” the Texas 
Supreme Court appears to be close to an “anti-model” of how any such 
dialogue should be conducted, though it should be recognized, as noted 
earlier, that even under these circumstances Texas did significantly 
change its process of school financing.183 
Kentucky is a dramatic contrast.  “[W]hat is noteworthy about the 
Kentucky case is that reformers’ broader democratic efforts meant that 
[the] Kentucky Supreme Court never had to take any remedial plunge at 
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all.  Indeed, it would actually reject all hints that there might be judicial 
management of the legislative process or education policy . . . .”184  By 
resolutely offering a “non-remedy,” the court in effect allowed elected 
officials to take “the lead in constituting a comprehensive reform law 
that soon became a model for the rest of the country.”185  One might, I 
suppose, wonder if this serves as a model of “dialogue,” if the ending is 
far happier, in many ways, than in Texas, precisely because the major 
role of the Kentucky court was to engage in a “bold stroke” that 
“propped up the legislature in its fight with the governor” and, in 
addition, “offered up a broad and inspiring rhetorical argument that 
called on others,” who the court knew were waiting for just such an 
invitation, “to seize the moment—to make history.”186 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that much more could be said.  What I hope I have done 
is the following: 
(1) To demonstrate that any analysis of “American constitution-
alism” must include due attention to the constitutions of the fifty states 
and not, as is usual, be limited to the United States Constitution, which 
differs in significant ways from many of the state constitutions.  Not only 
will one find a number of interesting things to reflect on, one might also 
appreciate the force of Donald Lutz’s reference to the national 
Constitution as an “incomplete text” that presumed the existence of states 
and their own constitutional commitments.187  Recall that the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution adverted to the importance of education as a 
state responsibility. 
(2) To suggest—“demonstrate” is probably too strong a term, until 
further research is done—that for a variety of reasons, dialogue may be 
far more likely with regard to state constitutions and the meanings 
assigned to these constitutions by state judiciaries than is the case if we 
focus only on federal courts, particularly the United States Supreme 
Court.  I am not arguing that dialogue with that institution is impossible 
or that it has never occurred, especially with regard to statutory 
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interpretation, where Congress obviously can have the last word.  
Instead, the occasions for any such dialogue, I suggest, are few and far 
between.  There are many potential explanations for this, ranging from 
the limited formal accountability, particularly of members of the 
Supreme Court, to other institutions or, even more certainly, to the 
electorate, to the sheer fact that the modern Court takes very few cases 
that genuinely concern most members of the public, and it is extremely 
easy, much of the time, to confine any rulings that might be issued—in 
what are often bitterly contentious five to four opinions—to very 
particular facts or contexts that might well be distinguished from 
ostensibly similar cases in other states.  All parents quickly learn that 
dialogues with their children may require that the parents present a 
“united front,” given a child’s remarkable skill in picking up signals of 
divisions between the parents, and even a united parental unit must 
expect—and respond to—repeated challenges.  Similarly, one wonders if 
a court that models discord and, not infrequently, acrimonious exchanges 
among the conflicting judges, can generate effective dialogues with 
others except insofar as a five-justice majority remains stalwart in its 
views and basically heedless of those who disagree, whether other 
justices, political institutions, or the public at large. 
Moreover, any significant dialogue about the United States 
Constitution, including Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
document, that raises the possibility of constitutional amendment 
immediately runs into the brick wall of functional impossibility, given 
the stringency of Article V.  This makes those who propose such 
dialogues—as I can testify to personally—appear to be at best utopian, at 
worst simply Quixotic in a decidedly unflattering sense.  For whatever 
reason, more consequential dialogues may be possible in at least some of 
the American states than within the wider United States. 
(3) At some point, one has to address the eighteenth century debate 
about the size limits on something that might be called a “Republican 
Form of Government,” which, for most analysts, includes overtones of 
dialogues among the citizenry in general and between ordinary citizens 
and those who govern them in particular.  When Madison defended the 
possibility of the “extended republic,” he was writing of a country of 
almost four million people, of whom most were excluded from political 
life because of gender or status as slaves—not to mention property 
requirements in some colonies and states.  Today the state of California, 
which contains roughly one-eighth of the total population of the United 
States today, is itself is almost ten times as large in population as the 
original United States.  And, of course, the percentage of this vast total 
that has the right to participate in political decision-making is also far 
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greater than could have been imagined in 1787.  Perhaps dialogue is 
perfectly sensible to contemplate in Canada, which is smaller in 
population than California; Australia, slightly larger than Texas; and 
New Zealand, which is roughly the same size as Minnesota.  Whether it 
makes much sense in the United States can be questioned, at least if the 
dialogue is imagined to include literally millions of Americans rather 
than, say, a representative sample.188 
(4) In all cases, it is almost certainly a mistake to use judicial 
supremacy or dialogue as dichotomous variables.  Courts are, I suspect, 
relatively unable, especially with regard to the kinds of positive rights 
that concern this paper, to foist truly major change on a political system 
that is truly resistant.  But it is clear that one must distinguish the 
different kinds of dialogical models that are presented in New Jersey, 
Kentucky, and Texas, which, obviously, are only three of the plethora of 
states whose courts have involved themselves, in one way or another, in 
what most people might describe as “educational reform.”  As always in 
comparative work, it is unclear exactly what can be learned from close 
attention to some of these differences.  Even if it is true, for example, 
that dialogue with the public is promoted by the popular election of 
judges, is that a good reason to support such elections?  If a key variable 
is the desirability of having judges with practical political experience and 
an ability to generate compromises among otherwise conflicting groups, 
then that presumably could become more of a criterion for appointing at 
least some judges, even if one might also appreciate the presence of some 
judges who have led more cloistered lives—and who, perhaps, take 
“constitutional theory” more seriously than do most ordinary political 
activists. 
This supports the view that one must view courts more as a “team”—
or perhaps an “orchestra”—than a collection of discrete individuals, so 
that one has to have a conception of the various players or instruments 
that are necessary when making selections.  Just as no rational football 
coach or orchestra conductor would continue drafting or selecting wide 
receivers or violinists indefinitely and would instead try to fill the need 
for interior linemen or oboists, so should anyone thinking of a multi-
member court think of the range of talents that one wants represented 
and try to make sure that as many of them as possible are in fact found in  
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a given court, even if it is obviously unlikely that any given judge would 
instantiate all of them. 
